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Kant and Fichte on Belief and
Knowledge
Halla Kim
1 One of the most venerable distinctions in philosophy is the one between knowledge
(episteme) and belief (doxa). Knowledge is one of the noblest/perennial goals of human
activities, and it has been typically associated with genuine or scientific cognition that
can provide truth whereas belief has been thought to present mere appearances or
subjective opinion, usually founded on sense perceptions. In this paper, I will argue
that for both Kant and Fichte, this standard view is mistaken, and, as opposed to this
mainstream  view,  both  of  them  present  beliefs  (Glaube)  as  more  important  than
knowledge.  In  his  lectures  on logic,  Reflexionen and published works,  Kant  presents
knowledge (Wissen), opinion (Meinung) and belief (Glaube) as our three main modes of
“holding-to-be-true” (Fürwahrhalten). Even though Kant admits that knowledge is prior,
and superior,  to belief as well  as opinion in their purely epistemic dimension, Kant
nevertheless ends up holding that belief in the more significant sense of a ‘postulate,’ is
more important than knowledge. I will also argue that this is the fundamental point of
his well-known doctrine of the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. The
standard  view  is  also  challenged  by  Fichte’s  thoroughgoing  transformation  of  our
epistemic  enterprise  or  rather  its  “reversal”.  For  Fichte, belief  (Glaube)  is  prior  to
knowledge (Wissen) (GA I/6, 253). Belief has something to do with “a resolution of the
will” to admit the validity of knowledge. In this respect, it indicates a “firmness of my
confidence,” that is “reason’s firm and unshakable adherence to a principle” (VM 104).
In this sense, it refers to our deepest commitment to and reaffirmation of our nature as
pure activity (Tathandlung). In other words, belief here is equated with the practical act
of the self that expresses its true nature as Tathandlung. This is why belief is clearly
different from discursive or propositional knowledge. In the course of the paper, I will
also show that Kant and Fichte seem to argue for their view in a different way. For
Kant, the superiority of belief is presented as part of his architectonic concern, i.e., as
an answer to the question “what may I hope” in the context of his elaborate theory of
postulates.  For  Fichte,  the  doctrine  is  presented  as  part  of  his  transcendental-
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ontological project of securing the reality of the self and the world from our moral
vocation. Or so I shall argue. 
 
1. Kant
2 Since the days of Plato, philosophers have often claimed that knowledge has a kind of
privileged status that a mere belief lacks. For Kant, a true science (Wissenschaft) must
carry universality and necessity where each of its components expresses knowledge
and forms a part of a systematic whole. Thus, for Kant, knowledge is universal and
necessary. Kant’s transcendental philosophy crucially involves justification of a priori
synthetic knowledge.  In particular,  in his epistemological  project,  knowledge comes
from the joint work of the sensibility and the understanding. The sensibility provides
the materials  but it  is  the understanding that  provides the a priori  forms that  can
organize and process the materials. But the forms are not derived from without. It is
the transcendental subject that is the source of the forms and that can serve as the
lawgiver of nature. 
3 In practical philosophy, the ethical subject gives law to herself as well. So the ethical
subject  is  a  lawgiver.  But the two laws that  the cognitive subject  and the practical
subject give are of fundamentally different types. The laws of nature are deterministic
causal laws, but the laws of actions are the laws of freedom. The human knowledge is
confined to the deterministic natural world but the ethical subject is able to act freely
beyond nature. Thus, there arises a discrepancy between nature and freedom. In this
way, we can see that there emerges a cleavage between theoretical reason and practical
reason in Kant’s project. This is part of the point that is addressed in his question,
“what may I hope?” in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason (B 832 - 847).1
4  But how does Kant bridge the gap between nature and freedom? How exactly does
Kant find that the physical world can “harmonize with” morality in this way? Is this
accomplished by way of divine agency or is this harmony a human task? Kant typically
views  judgments  as  intentional  actions  (Handlungen)  (A69/B94)  engaging  with  the
truth-value  of  propositions.  Thus,  for  him,  a  judgment  is  the  basic  unit  of  all  our
rational  activities.  For  this  reason,  any  propositional  attitude  is  an  instance  of
“holding-to-be-true” (das Fürwahrhalten) (A820/B848) (9: 66), constituting a determinate
way in which the rational cognitive subject produces an assertable judgment. (Hanna
2013)  Holding-to-be-true,  in  turn,  has  three  basic  kinds:  (i)  “opining”  (Meinen),  (ii)
“scientific knowing” (Wissen), and (iii) “believing” (Glauben) (A820–831/B848–859). 
5 Opining  is  an  epistemic  propositional  attitude  that  falls  short  of  “conviction”  (
Überzeugung), i.e., objective sufficiency for the rational/judging subject, and also falls
short of “persuasion” (Überredung),  i.e.,  mere subjective sufficiency for the rational/
judging subject. Hence opining includes such subjectively and objectively unconvinced
attitudes as entertaining a proposition, fiction, supposition, etc.
6 Believing, by contrast, includes subjective sufficiency or persuasion for the rational/
judging subject,  but  also,  on its  own,  falls  short  of  conviction,  which includes both
subjective sufficiency or persuasion and also objective sufficiency, which itself, in turn,
necessarily includes truth in such a way as to rule out any sort of accidental connection
between  epistemic  believing  and  truth,  i.e.,  cognitive-semantic  luck,  and  for  that
reason  is  also  called  “certainty”  (Gewissheit).  Finally,  then,  scientific  knowing  is
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perfected epistemic believing that has achieved conviction, i.e., objective sufficiency or
certainty.
7 Further,  Kant  divides  believing  or  Glauben  into  four  distinct  doxic  sub-kinds:  (i)
epistemic  (or  scientific-knowing-oriented)  belief,  (ii)  transcendental  metaphysical
belief,  (iii)  “pragmatic” (or instrumental) belief,  and finally (iv) “moral” (or ethical)
belief.  (Hanna  2013)2 For  Kant  moral  belief  is  a  propositional  attitude  that  is
epistemically objectively insufficient.  But it  can be fully and sufficiently justified in
practical terms. For it is backed up by the Categorical Imperative and the system of
duties it gives rise to, among them the duty of promoting summum bonum (the highest
good).  A  moral  belief  is  such  that  “it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  something  must
happen, namely that I fulfill the moral law in all points” (A828/B856). This is why the
Kantian  moral  belief  is  different  from  transcendent  metaphysical  belief,  which  is
unstable because it is bound to generate rationally unavoidable dialectical fallacies and
contradictions
8 Despite the many senses of believing or Glauben, for Kant, the most important kind of
believing is moral belief. A belief in this sense expresses a theoretical proposition that
cannot  be  proven  on  theoretical  grounds  alone  (CPrR  5:  122–134).  It  is,  however,
inextricably bound up with morality and in this respect importantly supported by the
latter. Further, even though it is not epistemically proved, i.e., scientifically verified, it
is rational as it is bound up with morality. So, unlike an epistemic belief, it cannot be
turned into knowledge. 
9 Is belief in this practical sense compatible with knowledge? Kant clearly suggests that
our knowledge concerns the natural world, i.e., the world of phenomena but belief in
this  sense  is  concerned  with  the  supersensible  world.  In  this  respect,  belief  is  not
necessarily  in  conflict  with  knowledge.  More  importantly  for  our  purpose,  Kant
suggests that belief in this sense is superior to knowledge. But why is this the case?
10 In the aftermath of the pantheism controversy that was all the rage in Germany in late
1770’s, Kant was also greatly alarmed by Friedrich Jacobi’s insistence on the need to
rethink the presumed worth of reason. Kant apparently conceived it  his mission to
sustain the Aufklärung in the face of Jacobi’s relentless attack. His doctrine of rational
faith, already worked out in the “Canon” of the first edition of the Critique, appeared to
silence  all  of  Jacobi’s  doubts.3 In  this  regard,  he  was  very  sympathetic  to  Moses
Mendelssohn’s critique of irrationalism inherent in Jacobi’s religiously oriented vision
of  morality.  The  latter’s  attempt  was  nothing  else  but  an  epitome  of  Schwärmerei.
Indeed, a Schwärmer is a mystic who believes that God is known intuitively through a
special sense organ. Blindly relying on the mystical perception of the divine, such a
fanatic thinks that one should subordinate all of one’s thoughts and actions to a single
purpose.  Private ideas are bound to dominate over the sense of objective reality in
fanaticism.4 Jabobi’s  fanaticism  leads  to  deception  and  manipulation.  Since  Jacobi
cannot make use of reason or rational argument he deceives people into believing by
inducing fear of reason and enlightenment.  In short,  Schwärmerei is  madness (Verrü
ckung). It also leads to a conception of God that is despotic. We cannot use reason to
evaluate the morality of God’s dictates. A threat of religious oppression immediately
looming.
11 On the other hand, throughout his career, Kant is not only cautiously opposed to any
form of  empiricist  skepticism which completely discounts knowledge but also he is
carefully  on  guard  against  all  forms  of  dogmatism.  The  metaphysical  beliefs  of
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dogmatism should not  encroach on the realm of  knowledge.  Thus,  he makes every
effort to put a limit on all attempts to give objective reality to the ideas of God, freedom
and the immortality of the soul. These are merely thinkable but not knowable. Thus, he
was not able to side with Mendelssohn’s ultra-rationalist trust in the unlimited power
of reason. In particular, to Kant’s eyes, the traditional rationalist attempt at proving
God, and immortality of the soul are no different from the ages-old dogmatic assertions
without any foundations. 
12 Kant’s  solution  to  the  conceptual  impasse  between  Jacobi’s  enthusiasm  and
Mendelssohn’s hyper-rationalism is the doctrine of rational belief. We have beliefs that
are rational yet not scientifically proven. Furthermore, these are beliefs that can serve
as  the  bridge  between  nature  and  freedom.  For,  even  though  these  beliefs  do  not
produce knowledge of the sensible world, they concern the supersensible world and its
inhabitants. Thus, in a famous passage in the B-edition Preface to the Critique of Pure
Reason he says that “I had to deny knowledge (Wissen) in order to make room for faith
(Glauben)” (Bxxx). As opposed to the super-rationalist attempt, he hopes to restrict the
scope  of  epistemic  believing  and  scientific  knowing,  by  means  of  his  Critical
epistemology and transcendental idealist metaphysics, in order to make room for fully
and sufficiently practically justified moral beliefs or believing. On the other hand, pace
fanaticism,  he  wishes  to  defend  these  beliefs  as  rationally  anchored  in  our  moral
outlook on the world. In this way, moral beliefs are shown to philosophically trump
epistemic  beliefs  (including  the  best  of  current  sciences)  and  also  doctrinal  beliefs
(including the traditional transcendent metaphysics). This is known as Kant's doctrine
of the primacy of the practical.
13 The  rational  but  moral  beliefs  here  concern  what  Kant  calls  “postulates  of  pure
practical reason” (CPrR 5: 122–134), which most notably include the immortality of the
soul and the existence of God. In Kant's ethics of belief,  the soul's immortality and
God's existence are something that we cannot possibly know scientifically, yet at the
same time they specify certain morally obligatory ways of living one's life as a rational
human agent.  For Kant,  postulates “give objective reality to the idea of  speculative
reason  in  general  (by  means  of  their  reference  to  what  is  practical)  and  justify  its
holding  concepts  even  the  possibility  of  which  it  could  not  otherwise  presume  to
affirm”  (5:132).  This  is  because,  as  theoretical  propositions,  “postulates  are…  then
presuppositions  having  a  necessarily  practical  reference,”  …  albeit  “not  one
demonstrable  as  such,  insofar  as  [they  are]  attached  inseparably  to  an  a  priori
unconditionally valid practical law” (5:122). The ideas of God and immortality are not
conditions  of  the  moral  law  but  only  conditions  of  the  necessary  object  of  a  will
determined by this law (ibid.). Thus we must assume or take them for granted as “the
necessary conditions for  observance of  the precept [of  the will]”  (5:132).  It  is  well-
known  that  Kant  identifies  three  postulates  for  his  ethical  system:  freedom,
immortality and the existence of  God (ibid.).  Most importantly for our purpose,  we
have the rational need to postulate the existence of God as the one who has the power
to bring virtue and happiness into harmony in that next life. This is the only way that
fairness will be achieved in the universe with virtue and happiness harmonized. It is
important to understand that Kant was not arguing that morality is invalid if God’s
existence is denied; rather, for Kant, the fact that something is a duty or obligation is
sufficient reason to do it.  The most fundamental move that Kant makes here is the
claim that a  reflection  on  our  moral  law requires  belief  in  free  will,  God,  and the
immortality of the soul. Although we cannot have knowledge of these things, reflection
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on the moral law leads to an authenticated belief in them, which amounts to a kind of
rational ‘faith.’ Nonetheless, Kant argues that the existence of God must be postulated if
the ultimate task of morality,  i.e.,  the highest good (summum bonum)  as our overall
happiness proportional to our virtue was to be carried out. Kant invokes the primacy of
practical  reason,  so  that  the  practical  subject  may  accept  the  postulates  of  God,
freedom and immortality “as a foreign possession handed over to it” (5:120). This is
how Kant links nature and freedom, i.e., the realm of theoretical reason and that of
practical  reason.  In  this  teleologically  contrived  scheme  of  things,  Kant  seems  to
suggest that the cognitive subject and the acting subject are one and the same because
the  principle  that  unifies  the  spheres  of  theoretical  and  practical  reason  is  the
assumption of a wise and benevolent God who has created a teleological world that
coheres with morality. 
14 Thus, in response to the question “What may I hope?” Kant answers that we human
beings  may  hope  that  our  souls  are  immortal  and  that  there  really  is  a  God  who
designed the world in accordance with principles of justice. Indeed, this question, as far
as its answer depends on claims regarding the consequences of moral righteousness
and the existence of God, is “simultaneously practical and theoretical” (A805/B833) and
it is answered by religion (AE 9:25). Kant’s account of hope consequently connects his
moral philosophy with his views on religion as well as knowledge. He emphasizes the
rational potential of such hope, but he also makes clear that rational hope is intimately
connected to  religious  faith,  i.e.,  the  belief  in  God for  embodied beings  such as  us
humans.
 
2. Fichte
15 Now I turn to Fichte’s view of belief and knowledge. Despite his continued engagement
with the venerable Kantian transcendental project in his Jena writings including the
System of Ethics, Fichte clearly feels that it falls far short. In particular, he complains
that Kant as well as his contemporaries have failed to ask what our power to act in the
world consists in, suggesting that they have merely focused on an analysis of our power
to represent the world. If you focus on the power of representations and its product
alone,  i.e.,  discursive  knowledge,  you cannot  find your  vocation in  life.5 Indeed,  as
Fichte succinctly shows in Book I  of the Vocation of  Man,  it  only leads to a soulless
universe  of  determinism.  Discursive  knowledge  cannot  explain  our  freedom  and
dignity.6 It is thus completely useless as a way of disclosing the dynamic reality itself.
What  is  more,  it  also  leads  to  solipsism.7 Theoretical  reason,  when  dogmatically
conceived in the manner of Spinozism, simply cannot explain freedom, the hallmark of
our active nature. Fichte thus gives up dependence on realist approaches to knowledge.
8
16 In  Book  II  of  the  same  work,  Fichte  goes  on  to  consider  theoretical  reason  now
conceived in the Kantian transcendental fashion, and finds that in it we are connected
to  the  world  only  through  our  representations  and  the  underlying  power  thereof.
There  must  be  something  outside  of  our  representations  but  we  cannot  make  any
progress if we are exclusively preoccupied with them. In other words, the theoretical
but transcendental knowledge cannot prove anything outside of itself. Something other
than purely cognitive and intellectual resources is needed in order to fully grasp and
ground this reality. Thus, the Kantian transcendental idealism (at least without what
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Fichte later calls “belief”9 or “conviction”) leads to skepticism. If idealism begins and
ends in Kant’s manner, i.e., with its transcendental-epistemological explanation of the
conditions of experience, 
you absolve me of all dependence by transforming me and everything around me
on which I might be dependent into nothing. You do away with necessity by doing
away with and annihilating all being (VM 60; GA I, 6: 247).
There is no being…. There are images… images which drift by, without there being
anything by which they drift … images which do not represent anything, without
meaning and purpose…. All reality is transformed into a fabulous dream, without
there being any life the dream is about… (VM 63-64; GA I, 6: 251)
17 Fichte then asks:
...what is that lies beyond all representations?" (ibid.)
18 He goes  on to  answer that  there  is  “something which is  more and higher  than all
knowledge and that contains the final purpose of knowledge within itself” (VM, 84; GA
I, 6: 254). This something turns out to be morality. This revelation then ties us to the
objective world (ibid). We now must renounce our dependence on mere knowledge and
aim at morality. But how can this be?
19 For morality to be possible,  Fichte points out,  there must be within me “a drive to
absolute independent self-activity” (VM 68; GA I, 6: 254),” which can ultimately serve as
“the point where consciousness connects with reality” (VM 68; GA I, 6: 254). We are
practical  agents  first  and  this  means  that  we  can  go  beyond mere  representations
because our consciousness is based on a drive to autonomy which is inseparably bound
up with our self-consciousness. Furthermore, this consciousness of ourselves reveals
itself as a feeling.10 It is this feeling that can give rise to the objective world only if it is
endowed with an objective certainty. But this latter cannot be granted by any sort of
logical-deductive  knowledge.11 In  fact,  as  the  latter  takes  its  departure  from  some
grounds, it would end up as a necessary link in an infinite chain of causal nexus, as we
have seen in VM I (VM 71, 74, and 75 (GA I, 6; 257, 260, and 261). So, the consciousness
here must be a consciousness that assets itself in action, not knowledge of a logical-
deductive sort. 
20 Fichte then suggests that it is the consciousness of our active agency that can send us
beyond mere knowledge, beyond mere representations.12 However, this consciousness
is not forced upon us but immediately stems from our voluntary decision to confront
our active agency and our moral vocation at its face. This decision of the will is then
what  Fichte  calls  “belief  (Gluabe).”13 It  is  typically  characterized  by  Fichte  as  “the
voluntary acquiescence in the view that naturally presents itself to us” (VM 71; GA I, 6;
257). In this respect, we can see that the Fichtean belief is connected to the will in the
most intimate way. It is a positing of the will that is given through the feeling of the
drive  to  autonomy.  Belief,  however,  is  never  separated  from  knowledge,  more
precisely,  from  a  judgement  and  motivations.  In  fact,  Fichte  says  that  belief  is
concerned with a vision of our vocation. 
21 It  is  now clear that among others,  freedom and intersubjectivity14 are needed for a
proper analysis of our action as moral beings. In other words, instead of resorting to
pure theory, we have to go beyond mere representations and focus on our self and its
action. Because we as subjects are agents, we must consider ourselves as independent,
namely, as able to think freely and so to act (ibid.) even if no knowledge can be its own
foundation and proof (VM, 71; GA I, 6: 257). Where then does this agency take us? It not
only gives rise to confidence in our own being as a self and in a real world in which we
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can act, but agency also implies free choice, and free choice brings with it the question
of which acts we ought to perform. Then the question of constraints and duty naturally
arise for us.15
22 For Fichte, then, theoretical philosophy cannot justify its own fundamental principle,
which must be grounded on a practical belief that is not knowledge “but a decision of
the will to recognize the validity of knowledge” (VM, 70–73, 76, 79, and 97; GA I, 6, 256–
59, 262, 264–65, and 283). It is not mere knowledge but belief that can allow for the
validity of knowledge. Our life as a whole depends on belief,  “not knowledge, but a
decision of  the will  to admit  the validity of  knowledge.” (VM, 71; GA I,  6:  257).  No
“knowledge can be its own foundation and proof,” because belief “first gives approval
to knowledge,” and so “every supposed truth, which is to be produced by mere thinking
without having its roots in belief, will surely be false and fallacious.” (VM 71–72; GA I, 6:
257–58).
23 In this way, transcendental reflection leads us to an objective world. But as there are
two modes of agency, i.e., physical agency and moral agency, the objective world must
be thought of as divided into two different spheres, the sphere of the sensible world
corresponding to our claim to physical agency, and the sphere of the supersensible
world corresponding to our moral agency.16 Because we are physical agents, we can
confront the real world in which that agency is effective. But we are also moral agents
and, accordingly, we must also confront a morally ordered world in which one’s ethical
intentions are similarly effective. 
24 We must now transition from the empirical knowledge of material determinism and
then  from  theoretical  transcendental  idealism  to  practical  transcendental  idealism.
This also means a transition to the immediate consciousness of self-sufficient freedom.
According to Fichte, the moral law requires that the moral subject obey the law without
any incentive other than respect for morality. It follows that moral willing is the only
goal of the moral subject’s activity; but since all our knowledge is discursive, the moral
subject must think about the act of moral willing as one member in a series of events,
which is connected to a final end by an ordering principle.17 
25 It follows that ultimately all knowledge claims depend on practical motives and beliefs,
which are “more and higher than all knowledge.” As Fichte himself puts it,
This voice [within me] leads me outside of  mental  representations,  out of  mere
knowledge,  to  something  which  …  is  more  and  higher than  all  knowledge  and
contains the final purpose of knowledge itself within it. (VM 68; GA I, 6: 254) 
26 This difference between belief and knowledge is “no mere verbal distinction but a true
deeply founded distinction of  the most important consequence.” It  follows that the
practical transcendental idealism that is suitable to our “dignity and vocation” is far
from  being  nihilistic.  Because  he  recognizes  that  believing  involves  a  volutary
acceptance of knowledge (and that knowing involves a free acceptance of belief), which
he chooses  not  because  he  “must”  but  because  he  “wants”  to,  he  apprehends  that
transcendental idealism is not fatalistic, as F. Jacobi charges. As Fichte puts it,
[I]t is not these [empty images of things supposedly existing outside ourselves] but
the necessary belief in our freedom and strength, in the reality of our acting . . .
that justifies all consciousness of a reality existing outside of us—a consciousness
which itself is only a belief since it is based on belief, but a belief that necessarily
follows from consciousness (VM, 79; GA I,6: 264).
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27 The Fichtean ‘belief’ is none other than our moral consciousness because the moral law
requires the moral subject to obey without disturbing another moral subject’s freedom,
so the moral subject cannot intend to influence others against their will. In this way we
can see that it is not empirical knowledge but transcendental act of will that justifies
the fundamental principles of discursive knowledge, which is necessary for life. The
purpose of life, and so the “final purpose of knowledge,” is moral activity (VM, 64–65
and 67–68;  GA I,  6,  251–52 and 253–54).  Thus,  Fichte  can be seen here deploying a
transcendental  argument,  based  on  the  Kantian  presupposition  that  purposive
behavior or agency is not the mere production of natural causal necessity, but aims at
efficacy in a purely rational order—or the cultivation of will  for sake of will.  Drive,
interest, and purpose are all gradations of rational activity that culminate in morality.
Of this Fichte emphatically claims:
This  voluntary  acquiescence  in  the  view  [that]  naturally  presents  itself  to  us,
because only on this  view can we fulfill  our vocation,  ...  first  gives  approval  to
knowledge and raises to certainty and conviction what without it would be mere
deception. ... All my conviction is only belief; and it proceeds from my disposition.
(VM, 71 (GA I/6, 257).18 
28 Furthermore, the Fichtean belief carries the sense of prudential belief in the efficacy of
rational action creating not only a better, but a utopian world: “[T]hat purpose has got
to be achieved. Oh, it is achievable in life and through life, for reason commands me to
live. It is achievable, for—I am” (VM, 91; BM, 276). 
29 Earlier,  in  the  System  of  Ethics,  conscience  (Gewissen)  is  also  offered  as  the  further
condition of the possibility of our practical, moral belief (SE IV 147). Here Fichte argues
that  conscience is  “the immediate  consciousness  of  that  without  which there is  no
consciousness: the consciousness of our higher nature and of our absolute freedom”
(ibid).  And  this  typically  takes  the  form  of  hearing  the  voice  within  ourselves.
Conscience, Fichte tells us, is concerned with “our consciousness of our determinate
duties” (SE IV: 173), and it produces a “conviction (überzeugung)” accompanied by the
subjective feeling of "certainty (Gewissheit).”19 Indeed, for Fichte, to lead a moral life
means to act with consciousness of duty. Thus, morality demands that we make sure to
ascertain for ourselves what our duty is (SE IV 153, 163). Thus, to act from duty requires
our conviction or belief concerning our duty.
30 Once we are clearly convinced of our determinate duties, we cannot act against them
(SE IV:191). When we are convinced about duty, it is wrong not to act in accordance
with it. We would be immoral when we obscure and neglect our consciousness of duty
(SE IV: 192). 
31 Consequently,  our moral/practical  belief  involves an employment of various mental
faculties including the original (or ethical) drive, the immediate feeling of conscience
(that never errs) and the reflecting power of judgment (that can err).20 As an individual
moral agent, I must examine what my duty is by way of deliberations about my actual
life situation, my current beliefs and other agents’ views. When I carry this out, I then
get the objective conviction about my duty, which is then accompanied by a subjective
feeling of certainty. So, when I hear the deliverances of my conscience, I  have “the
feeling of certainty that there is a compete harmony of my empirical I with the pure I”
(SE IV: 169). Conscience for Fichte then is the power of feeling that plays a critical role
in securing moral belief.21 Fichte claims:
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For the sake of conscience, every human being must judge for himself and must
compare  his  judgment  to  his  own  feeling:  otherwise  he  acts  immorally  and
unconscionably (SE IV: 168, 176).
32 In this way, as we make a moral decision, we come to grips with our own vocation, that
is to say, we are brought to confront just who we are. By means of conscience, then we
become acquainted with ourselves in action. “Only,” as Fichte puts it,  “through […]
commandments of  conscience do truth and reality come into my representations.  I
cannot refuse them my attention and my obedience without giving up my vocation”
(VM  76;  GA  I,  6:  261).  Conscience  then  expresses  the  very  relation  of  oneself  as  a
practical agent through which one comes to grips with one’s own true nature, not only
as mere theoretical reason, that is to say, as cognizer of reality and consciousness, but
also and primarily as something that has to be realized in this world through one’s
acting. In this respect,  we are only certain of our own ability and possibility to act
through conscience and through our “conception of a moral world” (VM 78; GA I, 6:
264). In other words, conscience entails a special kind of self-relation through which we
are acquainted with ourselves and our existence,  especially since our knowledge of
acting  is  something  about  which  we  are,  as  Fichte  explicitly  states,  “immediately
certain”  (VM  79;  GA  I,  6:  265).  Whereas  theoretical  knowledge  can  be  doubted,
knowledge of our own ability to be moral and, therefore, of our own being, cannot be
doubted. Of this, Fichte has this to say: “We raise ourselves out of this nothingness and
maintain ourselves above this nothingness only through our morality” (ibid.) 
33 At a critical  juncture in the third section of  the Vocation of  Man,  Fichte now boldly
declares: "Conscience alone is the root of all truth,” or alternatively, “truth,” as Fichte
puts it, “has its origin in conscience alone” (VM 72; GA I, 6: 268). For it is an absolute
presupposition that – in the moment of a drive to act – we must believe that our drive
is eo ipso our drive (i.e.., it is me who acts) and that it is the right and thus, “true,”
drive. Consequently, according to Fichte, conviction or belief is the necessary condition
of a “truth” that is established beyond the distinction between right and wrong, for it
constitutes our own consciousness in the moment of action and self-activity. This is to
say, it constitutes the truth of ourselves.22 Put differently, belief creates a basic truth
and absolute certainty of a decision in the very moment of the decision, which at this
very moment can no longer be “conceived” as wrong, that is, as something that does
not belong to the agent. As Fichte puts it,
Nor can I refuse to believe in the reality which [the commandments of conscience]
bring along without likewise denying my vocation. It is simply true, without further
testing and justification, it is the first truth and the ground of all other truth and
certainty, that I ought to obey that voice (VM 73; GA I, 6: 261, emphasis mine)
34 Because of our active nature, we have a goal, a vocation in life. In other words, we are
ineluctably  and  irreducibly  active  beings  and  this  immediately  implies  a  moral
universe. Why would moral obligations tell us that there is a real world? The point is
that the real power of human beings lies in action. At the conceptual climax of The
Vocation of Man, Fichte suggests that by anchoring his entire system properly on a firm
foundation  in  ‘belief,’  can  he  finally  dispose  of  the  genuine  threat  of  nihilism and
solipsism.  This  ‘belief’  involves  metaphysical  commitment  to  the  reality  of  a
supersensible world populated exclusively by active intelligences.23 Fichte’s implication
here is that the system in question concerns belief in our agency and in a realm of
external objects in which that agency is efficacious. Our entire life – not just theoretical
life but also practical life - then rests on belief. 
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35  Already two years earlier in “On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine Government of
the Universe” (1798), Fichte suggests that “our conviction concerning our own moral
determination or vocation is itself already the result of a moral disposition and is a
matter of belief” and goes on to claim that “belief is the element of all certainty” (147;
GA I,4: 351). Later, he also adamantly insists that "your vocation is not merely to know
but to act according to your knowledge" (VM 67; GA I, 6: 253).
36  What then is the content of the commitment shown by the Fichtean belief or for that
matter conscience? What is the belief a belief in? First of all, there is no question it
refers to our deepest commitment to and reaffirmation of our nature as pure activity.
As Fichte puts it, “what grounds all consciousness of a reality outside ourselves is the
necessary  belief  in  our  freedom and power  to  act,  in  our  actual  acting  and in  the
determinate laws of human acting. Such consciousness is itself only a belief, since it is
grounded on a belief [in our own acting], but it is a belief that necessarily follows from
the latter belief (VM 79; GA I/6, 265).  In this sense,  the (necessary) belief is  clearly
different from discursive or logico-deductive knowledge. For the former has something
to do with “a  decision of  the  will”  to  admit  the  validity  of  knowledge.  Belief  then
implies a “firmness of my confidence,” that is “reason’s firm and unshakable adherence
to a principle” (VM 104; GA I, 6: 290). 
37 For Fichte, belief also serves as a type of non-theoretical knowledge within his search
for an alternative conception of the self. It then expresses an immediate intuition of the
self whose nature is not fixed but in constant, dynamic operation. But this also implies
that we must believe in the reality of other finite rational beings and the sensible world
as well as the supersensible world, the last of which must include its governing law
which Fichte calls “One Infinite Will” (VM 105-107; GA, I/6 291-3).
38 Methodologically,  Fichte’s  practical  transcendental  idealism  purports  to  give  an
account  for  all  experience  strictly  in  terms  of  subjective  states  and  autonomous
intellectual activities. As Fichte puts it, 
[T]he consciousness of a thing outside of us is absolutely nothing more than the product of
our own representational  capacity…. in what we call  knowledge and observation of
things  we  always  and  ever  only  know  and  observe  ourselves,  and  …in  all  our
consciousness  we  simply  know  of  nothing  other  than  ourselves  and  our  own
determinations. (VM 59; GA I, 6: 246-47)
39 This is also the point that he made clear when he said that “everything which occurs in
our mind can be completely explained and comprehended on the basis of the mind
itself” early in his career in his “Review of Aenesidemus” (EPW, 69; GA I, 1; 15).24 
40  So, belief directly discovers the reality of meaning, purpose, and value (in the form of
the normativity of norms and of the efficacy of purposes).  But belief also indirectly
reveals  the  reality  of  freedom  and  of  ‘providence.’  This  of  course  means  that
mechanism and nihilism is false.  For on then can norms be genuinely binding,  and
purposes efficacious. Dogmatic Spinozism only leads to mechanism and determinism.
Indeed,  in  the  essay  “On the  Ground of  Our  Belief  in  a  Divine  Government  of  the
Universe,”  he also suggests  that  the “belief  must  be seen as  the core element of  a
religion that is  based in reason alone,” especially since,  as Fichte puts it,  the “true
belief” in the moral world order “is constituted by right action.”25
41 But belief in this peculiar Fichtean sense has another aspect as well– the teleological
aspect. As we have learned so far, “belief” refers to the certainty of the actuality of our
own  self.  However,  since  belief  in  our  morality  and  conscience  establishes  the
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possibility  of  actions and decisions,  we must  take the ends of  our action and their
means to them into account. As Fichte puts it, “can I will, without having something
which I will? No:--this would entirely contradict the nature of my mind” (VM 79; GA I,
6: 265). I am simply to act but if this is the case, then something resulting from this
activity must necessarily become a “purpose” for me. For “I ought to carry out the act
which is the means to this purpose and only to it” (VM 80; GA I, 6: 266). This, however,
does not meant that for Fichte purposes here should drive ‘the ought.’ Purposes should
not drive the will. Rather, the active will ‘ought’ to create the purpose. It is a short step
here to infer that “to every action there is united in my thought, immediately and by
the laws of thought itself, a condition of things placed in futurity, to which my action is
related as the efficient cause to the effect produced." Accordingly, "the end does not
determine  the  commandment;  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  primitive  purport  of  the
commandment determines the end" (VM 80; GA I, 6: 265) All my thoughts must have a
bearing on my actions, and must be capable of being considered as means, however
remote, to this end, and “as I live in obedience to it [viz. conscience, or belief], I live
also in the intuition of its purpose; live in the better world which it promises to me"
(VM 80-81; GA I, 6: 266). 
42 As pointed out earlier, the Fichtean belief clearly does not express ordinary discursive
knowledge as it involves a “decision of the will to recognize the validity of knowledge”
(VM 71; GA I, 6: 257). Indeed, it is a “voluntary acquiescence in the view which naturally
presents  itself  to  us  because  only  on  this  view  can  we  fulfill our  vocation”  (Ibid.)
However, note this does not mean that belief is arbitrary, imposed, or irrational. It is an
activity  of  reason,  albeit  without  any involvement of  such operations as  reflection,
abstraction or comparison.26 Following this claim, Fichte also suggests that belief can
even quickly  turn into “[…]  good will  […]”  and conscience (which,  by the way,  are
moral/practical concerns) (VM 72; GA I, 6: 258). In a word, “we are all born in belief”
(VM 73; GA I,  6:  259).  We don’t have to blindly act in accordance to a naturalistic/
materialist hard determinism, if we are, in fact, free, as posited by Fichte. Our ‘vocation’
is that we can act in accordance to our will, rather than, by nature (Ibid.). 
43 This view of belief on the part of Fichte, however, is not an aberration in his system nor
a  return  to  a  pre-critical  dogmatism  but  consistent  with  Fichte’s  transcendental
project. In particular, the Fichtean ‘belief’  is not a retraction of the transcendental-
epistemological approach to explaining experience.27 “The world,” as Fichte puts it in
“Our Belief in a Divine Governance,” is “nothing more than our own inner acting (qua 
pure intellect), made visible to the senses in accordance with comprehensible laws of
reason  and  limited  by  incomprehensible  boundaries  within  which  we  simply  find
ourselves to be confined (EPW 149, G/A I,4: 353) [i.e., unchosen empirical givens]. Fichte
thus continues:
Granted, the origin of these boundaries is incomprehensible; but, replies practical
philosophy….  [n]othing is  clearer  or  more  certain  than  the  meaning  of  these
boundaries: They constitute your determinate place in the moral order of things.
(“Our Belief in a Divine Governance,” ibid.)
44 In an important suggestion, Stephen Hoeltzel argues that the Fichtean ‘belief’ is subject
to  critical  control  by  the  transcendental-epistemological  explanation of  experience.
Fichte accordingly holds that we posit nothing of a kind not proven to exist by the
aforementioned explanation. We have no reason to believe in any other kinds of things.
28 As Fichte claims, 
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free spirits alone are real … an independent, sensible world through which they
might act upon each other is quite unthinkable. (VM 109; GA I, 6: 294) 
45 The Fichtean ‘’belief’ then comprises metaphysical commitments that complement and
contextualize  the  transcendental-epistemological  explanation  of  experience.  These
commitments  are  neither  ingredient  in,  nor  deductively  entailed  by  the  above
explanation. The Fichtean belief thus shows a firm commitment to the reality of extra-
subjective entities: specifically, a real ‘world of reason’ (a supersensible order of free,
active, interacting intelligences),29 which appears to the finite subject, as a mechanistic
material world. As a result, nihilism, pace Jacobi, is false. 
46 In  conclusion,  we  may  say  that  the  Fichtean ‘belief’  is premised  upon an
quintessentially transcendental project and, in particular, upon the Wissenschaftslehre
’s ‘first  principles,’  which  articulate  the  ultimate  conditions  of  the  possibility  of
experience)  30 For ‘belief’ undertakes to capture the primordially projectival nature of
the transcendental subject (the finite rational being). In this respect, belief involves an
essential commitment to the total rational comprehension and moral perfection of all
that it experiences. Here is what Fichte has to say:
The whole final purpose of reason is its own pure activity…. (VM 99; GA I, 6: 284) 
47 A  full  metaphysical  commitment  is  thus  offered  by  ‘belief’  and the  transcendental
subject exists in relation to something other than itself, i.e., a ‘higher’ order of being
that  its  sensory  states  somehow  signify,  and  that  its  autonomous  endeavors  can
advance or enhance. As Fichte puts it,
If I am to be able to recognize that obedience as ration, if it really is to be reason
which forms my being, and not an extravagant fancy of own invention or dragged
in  from  somewhere  or  other  …  then  this  obedience  [to  the  imperative  of
autonomous activity] must have some outcome or serve some purpose. Evidently it
does not serve the purpose of the natural earthly world. There must, therefore, be a
supernatural world whose purpose it serves. (VM 93; GA I, 6: 278) 
48 ‘Belief’  for  Fichte  then  constitutes  an  irreducible  and  unobjectionable  practical
postulation . This is no theoretical proof-no epistemic norms obligate anyone to adopt
this  view  of  things.  According  to  Fichte’s  transcendental  idealism,  then  the
ultimate ethical norm does thus obligate us and norm has as much authority over the
rational being as do any and all principles of theoretical rationality. 
49 Note that this metaphysical commitment cannot be justified on epistemic grounds, as
shown by  the  discussions  so  far,  but  can be  vindicated on ethical  grounds.  In  this
regard, he inherits the strategy from Kant as the latter is committed to the objective
but practical reality of God and other supersensible entities on ethical grounds. This
means that for Fichte’s  project,  ethical  norms are no less authoritative for rational
beings than are epistemic ones. 
50 While ‘belief’ falls far short of the basic requirements for rational discursive, logical-
deductive knowledge, it remains in perfect accord with the ultimate requirements of
reason (considered in its purest and most radical forms). In this respect, belief may be
equated with intellectual intuition. Faith establishes what Fichte calls the “harmony of
all external things with his [man’s] own necessary, practical concepts of them,” which
is the “total self-harmony or absolute identity.” It can be realized through the will in
fulfilling the final end of man’s perfection.31
51 Fichte  also  points  out  that  Knowledge  produced without  belief  "is  surely  false  and
fallacious, since bare and pure knowledge . . . leads only to the insight that we can know
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nothing. … I know that such false knowledge never can discover anything other than
what by faith it has first put into its premises... ” (VM 72; GA I, 6: 258). In a passage that
sounds almost paradoxical, Fichte claims that “we do not act because we know, but we
know because we are meant to act. Practical reason is the root of all reason" (VM 79: GA
I, 6: 265).
52 In  this  way,  we  are  able  to  construct  our  view  of  world  with  the  immediate
consciousness of ourselves, through our certainty about our conscience and our moral
vocation. The vision that Fichte has about the entire world does not leave room for any
theoretical  or  conceptual  explanation  of  the  creation  of  this  self-certainty.  This  is
because every explanation is tied back to theoretical reason, but – instead – we will find
an element in our consciousness that allows us to see while we are acting.
 
3. Kant and Fichte
53 From what we have observed, it is clear that Kant and Fichte are united in holding that
belief in the practical sense is more important than epistemic knowledge. Further, this
importantly stems from their common view that practical reason is more important
than theoretical  reason. How then is  the Fichtean belief  different from the Kantian
postulates?  The motivation for  Kant’s  theory of  postulates,  as  we have seen,  stems
partly from Kant’s stake in the pantheism controversy, as well as from his architectonic
conception of philosophy, which culminates in his doctrine of the primacy of practical
reason over theoretical  reason.  However,  Kant never claims that  theoretical  reason
originates from practical reason. He merely claims that the claims of practical reason
take precedents over those of theoretical reason.
54 On the other hand, Fichte’s motivation stems importantly from the ultimate goal of
establishing the Wissenschaftslehre on the firm foundation of the self’s  pure activity.
While Fichte’s belief is different from speculative/dogmatic flight of fancy, there is no
denying  that  what  conscience  -  as  our  inner  voice  -  delivers,  i.e.,  a  conviction,  is
immediately  intuitive,  infallible  and  certain  as  far  as  Fichte  is  concerned.  But  the
Kantian postulates are not of this nature. It may take an ’existential’ leap of faith to
accept the Kantian postulates but they definitely require heavy rational backing from
moral considerations. It is also obvious that Fichtean the feeling of conscience cannot
be doubted (“conscience never errs”!) at least its formal aspect is concerned. However,
Kantian Glauben may be doubted, it seems. 
55  Further,  the  Fichtean  belief  is  not  propositional  while  the  Kantian  Glauben  are
propositional. In other words, the Fichtean belief is not discursive whereas the Kantian
Glauben  are  discursive,  albeit  the  latter  are  “theoretical  propositions”  inextricably
bound up with practical cognition. We can also point out that the Fichtean belief is not
reflexive. Finally, the Fichtean belief is voluntary yet intellectual. At least the Fichtean
belief  about self’s  active nature seems to involve intellectual  intuition.  The Kantian
Glauben are composed of the Ideas of reason and have nothing to do with intellectual
intuition.  However,  Fichte  suggests  that,  while  our  belief  about  our  own  nature  is
immediately  certain,  our  belief  about  the  external  world  of  sense,  etc.  is  not
immediately certain and the latter’s certainty must be derived from the former. 
56 The most radical difference between the two, however, seems to be that belief is the
source of  our knowledge of  the world on the part  of  Fichte,  but  not  Kant.  For the
former, as Zöller puts it, “freedom and its laws have original certainty and epistemic
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authority for theoretical knowledge claims.”32 After all, for Fichte, “practical reason is
the root of all reason” (VM 98: GA I/6, 265). Beginning with the self, Fichte, on the sole
basis of the beliefs, goes on to prove the existence of the material body which is the
substantial agent of the self’s action, and the non-self or external material world, which
is  the object  of  its  actions,  and also other selves by way of  summons.  The Kantian
Glauben are not the source of the knowledge at all. The latter are merely compatible
with the scientific knowledge of the natural world. Conscience/belief is the source of
knowledge of the world, at least when formally considered, because it gives rise to the
discursive  knowledge  by  forming  the  latter’s  condition  of  possibility.  The  Kantian
Glauben,  however,  can  be  made  compatible  with  and  can  be  harmonized  with  the
knowledge of the world. Finally, the Fichtean subject first acts before doing anything
else.  The  Kantian  subject  performs  the  act  of  self-consciousness  first  as  the
transcendental  apperception  so  it  is  primarily  theoretical-conceptual.  The  Kantian
subject is also premised on the distinction between the appearances and the things in
themselves while the Fichtean subject knows no such distinction—the whole world is
nothing more than the manifestation of the inner acting of the self, albeit Book III of
the Vocation of Man also ventures out to suggest that what is now considered to be the
proper domain of  legitimate philosophical  inquiry has  expanded considerably  since
1794,  inasmuch  as  it  now  embraces  the  entire  supersensible  world,  understood  as
existing on its own, apart from the finite human mind, as well as the independently
existing author of the same: “the One, which exists . . . the original source [Urquelle] of
both you and me”(VM, 107; GA, I/6: 293). 33
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4. Michah Gottlieb, 81.
5. Steinberg, 57.
6. Dogmatic  realism  typically  holds  epistemological  foundationalism  and  assumes  that  the
ordinary discursive knowledge has a foundation in basic knowledge that has direct connection to
extra-mental reality. For Fichte, dogmatic realism claims that the non-self (Nicht-Ich) is the cause
of representations and that the representations are an effect of the non-self; thus, the non-self is
the real ground of everything, and the self (Ich) is a mere accident of the non-self and not a
substance at all (Foundations of Entire Wissenschaftslehere (FEW for short), GA I, 2: 310). On the basis
of  this,  he  also  argued  that  the  very  concept  of  a  “thing  in  itself,”  understood  as  a  mind-
independent, external “cause” of sensations, is indefensible on critical grounds in the Foundations
of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre.
7. Fichte acknowledges that neither dogmatism nor idealism could directly disprove each other
and  thus  recognizes  that  the  choice  between  philosophical  starting  points  could  never  be
resolved on purely theoretical grounds by famously asserting that “the sort of philosophy one
chooses depends upon the sort of person one is” (GA I, 4: 195). He nevertheless denies that any
dogmatic  realism,  that  is  to  say,  any  system  that  commences  with  the  concept  of  sheer
objectivity,  could  ever  succeed  in  accomplishing  what  was  required  of  all  philosophy.
Dogmatism,  he  argued,  could  never  provide  a  transcendental  deduction  of  ordinary
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consciousness, for, in order to accomplish this, it would have to make an illicit leap from the
realm  of  “things”  to  that  of  mental  events  or  “representations”  (Vorstellungen).  Idealism,  in
contrast, at least when correctly understood as the kind of Critical idealism that demonstrates
that the intellect itself must operate in accordance with certain necessary laws, can—at least in
principle—accomplish the prescribed task of philosophy and explain our experience of objects
(“representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity” (GA I, 4: 187) in terms of the necessary
operations of the intellect itself, and thus without having to make an illicit appeal to things in
themselves.
8. Cf. “My connection with the whole of nature… determines all I was, all I am, and all I will be….
Whatever  I  am and become I  am and become necessarily,  and it  is  impossible  for  me to  be
anything else (VM, 14; GA I, 6: 201). . . . “I don’t act at all but nature acts in me…. Nature makes
me and whatever I become.” (VM, 19; GA I, 6: 207)
9. The Fichtean term, “Glauben,” is sometimes translated as “faith” but this translation can be
misleading if faith here implies non-rational or even irrational mental states of various kinds.
Further, pace Jacobi’s trenchant protest, the Fichtean Glauben is natural, not supernatural.
10. Even in FEW, Fichte suggest that “reality is possible for the self, as well as for the non-self
only by means of a relation to feeling. . . . With respect to reality as such—that of the self and of
the non-self—there is only a feeling” (GA, I/2, 429).
11. Marco Ivaldo, 280.
12. Rockmore, 150
13. In the Second Introduction, Fichte says that “it is only through the medium of the moral law
that  I  catch  a  glimpse  of  myself”  and  goes  on  to  claim  that  “I  necessarily  view  myself  as
spontaneously self- active” (GA I, 4: 219).
14. Fichte’s  notion  of  intersubjectivity  is  most  perspicuously  developed  under  the  idea  of
summons (Aufforerung) as part of his theory of recognition (Annerkennung) In the Foundations of
Natural Right.
15. Steinberg, 62.
16. Steinberg, 66.
17. Yolanda Estes, 91
18. See also, VM 75; GA I,6: 261. Compare “Divine World Governance,” GA I/5, 354.
19. Conviction here must be based on a practical reasoning that a power of judgment engages in.
This judgment then is followed and confirmed by the feeling of harmony (SE 4: 166). Thus, the
Fichtean conviction or for that matter belief cannot just any subjective opinion (Allen Wood,
166-7).
20. “Some Lectures concerning the Scholar’s Vocation,” in Early Philosophical Writings, 179 (GA I,3:
61);  “On the Basis  of  Our Belief in a  Divine Governance of  the World” in Introductions  to  the
Wissensschafteslehre, 147, GA I,4: 351.
21. The latter essentially involves affective and cognitive components, so to speak. I owe this to
Kien-how  Goh’s  observation.  Wayne  Martin  raised  an  interesting  question  about  the
phenomenological manifestation of conscience,  which might take the form - in the case of a
belief that I ought to do X - of an immediate feeling of harmony/disharmony of my cognition of X
with what is demanded by the original (or ethical) drive. When in harmony, the feeling is one of
contentment and approval. Otherwise, it's one of annoyance and disapproval. Sometimes, Fichte
also puts it in terms being at one with or contradiction with oneself, or agreement of the head (or
mind) with the heart. Finally, the peace of the mind ensues when there is the inner harmony
between thoughts and convictions (156, 164). But, of course, there are many questions that need
to be answered as well.
22. Christian Lotz, 30.
23. Hoeltzel, “Non-Epistemic Justification and Practical Postulation in Fichte,” 296.
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24. Jacobi characterizes the Fichten belief as: “rational intuition, or the intuition of reason” i.e.,
direct non-sensory awareness of supersensible realities. Indeed, it is an organ with which we are
aware of the supersensible (MPW 540). “Just as there is an intuition of the senses, an intuition
through the sense, so there is also a rational intuition through reason ... (MPW 563)” and it “…
gives us objects that transcend nature for our cognition, i.e. it makes us certain of their actuality
and truth” (MPW 563.) But he most grotesquely misunderstood Fichte when he characterized the
latter’s view as nihilism that reduced all knowledge and meaning to nothingness in his “Open
Letter to Fichte” (GA III, 3: 224-81).
25. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, 146: GA I/4, 351.
26. Günter Zöller suggests that belief here expresses the unity of intelligence and volition, head
and heart, thinking and willing (Zöller, 124).
27. Hoeltzel, 299.
28. Ibid.
29. For a complete list of Fichte’s ontological commitment, see Breazeale, 217.
30. Hoeltzel, 308. The ultimate goal of the Wissenschaftslehre is not to produce knowledge in itself
nor analyze it but the intuitive understanding that the self is an activity (Tathandlung), not an
object. Indeed, early in the Jena Wissenschaftlehre Fichte made it sufficiently clear that the goal of
philosophy is not a mere knowledge but knowledge in the very special sense of the knowledge of
knowledge,  i.e.,  foundational  knowledge,  and  how  this  is  possible  on  the  firm  basis  of  the
fundamental activity of the self, which knowledge is clearly demarcated from ordinary discursive
knowledge
31. “Lectures Concerning the Vocation of Scholars,” EPW 150-1; GA I, 4: 299.
32. Zöller, 124.
33. I would like to thank the audience at the North American Fichte Society’s biennial conference
on Kant and Fichte at Sogang University in Seoul, especially Wayne Martin and Steve Hoeltzel for
stimulating questions and discussions.  The members of  the department of  philosophy at  the
University of Nebraska at Omaha also provided helpful suggestions. Finally, I thank Kienhow Goh
for comments on the entire penultimate draft of the paper.
ABSTRACTS
One of the most venerable distinctions in philosophy is the one between knowledge and belief.
Knowledge has been typically associated with genuine or scientific cognition that can provide
truth  whereas  belief  has  been  thought  to  present  mere  appearances  or  subjective  opinion,
usually founded on sense perceptions. In this paper, I will argue that for both Kant and Fichte,
this standard view is  mistaken and that they present belief  (Glaube)  as more important than
knowledge. Even though Kant admits that knowledge is prior, and superior, to belief as well as
opinion in their purely epistemic dimension, he nevertheless ends up holding that belief in the
more significant sense of a ‘postulate,’ is more important than knowledge. I will also argue that
this is the fundamental point of his well-known doctrine of the primacy of practical reason over
theoretical  reason.  The  standard  view  is  also  challenged  by  Fichte’s  thoroughgoing
transformation  of  our  epistemic  enterprise.  According  to  Fichte,  belief  (Glaube)  is  prior  to
knowledge (Wissen),  since it has something to do with “a resolution of the will” to admit the
validity of knowledge. Belief here is equated with the practical act of the self that expresses its
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true nature as Tathandlung. In the course of the paper, I will also show that Kant and Fichte seem
to argue for their view in a different way. For Kant, the superiority of belief is presented as part
of his architectonic concern, i.e., as an answer to the question “what may I hope” in the context
of  his  elaborate  theory  of  postulates.  For  Fichte,  the  doctrine  is  presented  as  part  of  his
transcendental-ontological  project of  securing the reality of  the self  and the world from our
moral vocation.
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